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NOTES AND COMMENT
SOME ASPECTS OF THE CONCORD INTERSTATE COMPACT
ON LABOR.
During the last decade there has been widespread recognition of
the value and feasibility of adopting interstate compacts as a means
for adjusting differences between states." Certain physical and juris-
dictional problems which are regional in character involving the
interests of two or more states have often been the subject of such
compacts. 2 Settlement of boundaries, the control of waterways 3
and overlapping jurisdiction in crimes 4 and in taxation 5 are typical
problems. Recently a new application of compacts has been sug-
gested as a means for attaining uniform minimum standards of labor
and industrial laws among the states. The existing disparity in these
standards has resulted in frequent migrations of industrial plants
and factories from one state to another. Such migrations have been
accompanied by serious economic disturbances. To cope with the
problem, several regional states have embarked upon a movement to
adopt interstate compacts. The movement presents interesting eco-
nomic and legal questions which will be considered in the following
discussion. 6
I Donovan, State Compacts as a Method of Settling Problems Common
to Several States (1931) 80 U. OF PA. L. REv. 5; Wilson, Interstate Compacts
Under the Constitutio--Past Uses and Filture Possibilities (1932) 57 Am. BAR
AssN. REP. 734; ELY, OIL CONSERVATION THROUGH INTERSTATE AGREEMENTS
(1933). See also Bruce, The Compacts and Agreements of States With One
Another and With Foreign Powers (1918) 2 MINN. L. REv. 500; Frankfurter
and Landis, The Compact Clause of the Constitution--A Study in Interstate
Adjustments (1925) 34 YALE L. J. 685; Report of Committee on Interstate
Compacts, PROCEEDINGS NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMx MISSIONERS ON UNI-
FORM STATE LAWS (1921) 297; Note (1931) 31 YALE L. J. 635. See Wash-
ington v. Oregon, 214 U. S. 205, 218, 29 Sup. Ct. 631 (1909) and New York
v. New Jersey, 256 U. S. 296, 313, 41 Sup. Ct. 292 (1921) (In these cases, the
Supreme Court recommended interstate cooperation).
' Former Governor Pinchot in his message to a special session of the
Pennsylvania legislature (1926) urged competing states in the anthracite coal
industry to enter into compacts. See N. Y. Times, Jan. 14, 1926. The Guffey
Coal Bill enacted in 1935 has put the problem under federal control. See
Note (1929) 7N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 515; Note (1926) 26 COL. L. REv. 216; Note
(1922) 35 HARV. L. REV. 322; Note (1922) 31 YALE L. J. 635; Note (1935)
35 COL. L. REv. 76.
' See Appendices I and II of ELY, op. cit. supra note 1.
' Congress has passed resolutions giving blanket consent to states to enter
into compacts for efficient control of crime. P. L. No. 293, 73d Cong., 2d
Sess. (1934). See recent movement of states to adopt interstate compacts for
repression of crime, N. Y. Times, Oct. 4, 1935; cf. Dean, The Interstate Com-
pact: A Device for Crime Repression (1934) 1 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROB-
LEmS 460. See 36 STAT. 962, c. 186, §7, 16 U. S. C. A. 516 (1911) ; amended
43 STAT. 1215, c. 473 (1925) (consent for conservation of forests and water
supply).
Kansas and Missouri; see 42 STAT. 1058, c. 431 (1922) (reciprocal exemp-
tion from taxation). Held, Constitutional, State v. Joslin, 116 Kan. 615,
227 Pac. 543 (1924).
'In Canada, the divided authority exercised by the Provincial and Domin-
ion Governments has given rise to problems similar to those in the United
19351
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Economic Aspect.
The marked differences in the labor laws of the various states
have been a vital underlying cause for the failure of progressive
labor legislation. Workmen's compensation laws differ among the
states.7 Laws regulating child and woman labor, industrial home-
work, unemployment insurance, safety and health protection in indus-
try, hours and wages are either absent in some states or of no
moment. 8 This situation has encouraged numerous manufacturers
to migrate to those neighboring states or to the south where the laws
are least exacting.9 Furthermore, the abusive practice of sending
industrial homework to states where the absence or weakness of
regulation opens a cheap labor market has also been encouraged. As
a result of the migrations, harboring states become the centers of
sweated trades, unemployment sections are created and a natural
shifting of the labor market follows.' 0 The migrations impair the
States. Interprovincial conferences inaugurated in 1887 have been concerned
with industrial and other problems. See MINUTES OF THE PROCEEDINGS IN
CONFERENCE OF THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PROVINCES (1887, 1902, 1906,
1910, 1913), also Report of National Industrial Conference, Ottawa, 1919;
Report of the Dominion-Provincial Commission, Uniformity of Labour Las,
reprinted in LABOUR GAZETTE, May, 1920; Precis of Discussions of Dominion-
Provincial Conference, 1927. See Goldenberg, Social and Economic Problems
in Canadian Federalism (1934) 12 CAN. B. REv. 422.
We are indebted to Hon. W. M. Dickson, Deputy Minister of Labour,
Canada, for this information.
'All states now have workmen's compensation laws except Arkansas and
Mississippi. Workmen's Compensation in the United States (April, 1934)
MONTHLY LAB. REV. 840. Interstate compacts to protect workers from depri-
vation of compensation because of injuries in foreign jurisdictions would be a
worthy undertaking. See Smith v, Aerovane Utilities Corp., 259 N. Y. 126,
181 N. E. 72 (1932) ; Hartford Acc. etc. Co. v. United States Fidelity etc. Co.,
209 App. Div. 352, 204 N. Y. Supp. 791 (1st Dept. 1924); Recent Decision
(1932) 32 COL. L. REV. 1427.
'Sixteen states now have minimum wage laws for women and children-
California, Colorado, Connecticut, Illinois, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, South
Dakota, Utah, Washington, and Wisconsin. In Minnesota, however, the
attorney-general has ruled that the law is constitutional only as to children,
and in Colorado no appropriation has been made to put the law into effect.
AM. LAB. LEG. REv., Dec. 1934 at 180, June 1934 at 73, and Sept. 1935, at 140.
There are now twenty-eight states with an old-age pension law, At. LAB. LEG.
REV., June 1934 at 74; Unemployment Insurance Bills in the United Statesfor 1934 (June 1934) Am. LAB. LEG. REV. 63; Labor Legislation Among the
States for 1934 (Dec. 1934) AM. LAB. LEG. REV. 181; Harper, Due Process of
Law in State Labor Legislation (1928) 26 MICH. L. REV. 599, 763, 888.
9"New Jersey is a land teeming with sweatshops. The sweatshops come
out from New York in the north and Pennsylvania in the south. They live
off the poverty and the weakness of the working people of New Jersey. They
do not contribute to the welfare of the state." By Prof. Thomas W. Holland,
labor compliance officer of the New Jersey Division of N.R.A. speaking in
support of N.R.A. codes. Quoted in N. Y. Times, June 17, 1934, IV, at 7.
'0 "The migration of factories and workers from New Hampshire to other
states represents a definite loss to this state. Although this may to some extent
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collective bargaining power of workers and their unions. Honest
businesses competing with these fugitive industries are placed at a
distinct disadvantage and are forced to lower wage scales and stand-
ards of employment. The instance is related of a Pennsylvania
corporation which underbid a New York firm on a contract. It
later appeared that the difference between the two bids was a sum
of money equal to that which the New York firm paid for a higher
workmen's compensation rate."1 Besides endangering the wage-
earner by leading to lower wages and long hours of work, the labor
law differentials afford occasion for unfair competitive practices.
When new legislation is sought in the states, there are often repre-
sentatives of industry who raise a clamor of opposition by contending
that competitors of neighboring states will be given advantages. As
a consequence, the legislation is often defeated. 12
For a time, the temporary N.R.A. codes equalized these differ-
entials by laying down standards of employment for every section
of the country.1 3  But even before the inception of the codes, it
became apparent to labor leaders and state executives that concerted
action by the states themselves was necessary for the maintenance
and improvement of labor and industrial standards. To gain such
action, Franklin D. Roosevelt, while Governor of New York, called
a conference of executives of the northeastern states in 1931.14 This
was the initiation of a series of interstate conferences. Governor
Pinchot called one again later in 1931 at Pennsylvania, 15 and at
another conference at Boston 16 in 1933, Governor Winant of New
Hampshire suggested the use of interstate compacts to attain uni-
form standards in the state labor laws. Similar regional interstate
conferences have been held in the south. 17
be offset by new factories that come here from the outside, the general effect
of such shifting of plants and workers is disrupting to the industrial life of
the community and the state." REPORT OF THE NEW HAMPSHIRE COMMISSION
ON INTERSTATE COMPACTS AFFECTING LABOR AND INDUSTRIES (Jan. 1925) at 21.
See N. Y. Times, Nov. 12, 1934 at 1.
"Proceedings of National Conference for Labor Legislation (1934) Bu-
REAU OF LABOR STATISTICS; MONTHLY LABOR REV. (April 1934) at 779.2 Ibid.
Schoenfeld, Analysis of the Labor Prov sions of N.R.A. Codes (March
1935) MONTHLY LABOR REV. 574; Wolman, Acconplishment of N.R.A. in
Labor Legislation (March 1935) AM. LABOR LEG. REV. 38; LYON, NATIONAL
RECOVERY ADMINISTRATION (1935).
4 Held at Albany and attended by governors of Massachusetts, Rhode
Island, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Ohio.
" Conference at Harrisburg, Pa., in June, 1931. Attended by representa-
tives of states enumerated snpra note 14 and those of Delaware, Maryland, and
West Virginia. Interstate Conference on Labor Compacts (Dec. 1934) PENN-
SYLVANIA LABOR AND INDUSTRY.
"
8This conference continued the work of the one at Harrisburg.
""A Southeastern Interstate Conference was held at Atlanta, Ga., on
Dec. 13, 1933. Labor problems of Alabama, Florida, Georgia, South Carolina,
and Tennessee considered. A comparative analysis of the labor laws of these five
states was made by the U. S. Dept. of Labor. See Bul. No. 603, Labor Laws
of the United States Series. Another southern regional conference was con-
1935 ]
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The proposal to use interstate compacts as a means for attaining
uniform minimum standards of employment is an innovation, although
the compact method itself, as pointed out above, has often been
employed to adjust differences between states.' 8
A commission on Interstate Compacts was formed by legislative
enactment in Massachusetts; 19 other states including New York 20
now have similar bodies. The Massachusetts Commission has issued
periodic reports 21 which contain a complete history of the movement
and an analysis of the labor laws of industrial competitive states.
Recommendations were made for the application of compacts to
various phases of labor and industrial problems. The commission's
recommendation for a minimum wage law in Massachusetts similar
to those existing in New York, New Hampshire and New Jersey
was enacted into law by the legislature of Massachusetts.2 2  Shortly
thereafter, a minimum wage compact was entered into at Concord, by
six states.23 Only the legislatures of Massachusetts and New Hamp-
shire 24 have thus far ratified the pact; consent of Congress will be
necessary to bind the two and those that may subsequently ratify.
yoked by Secretary of Labor Perkins in Jan., 1935; representatives of twelve
states attended. (Discussed standards for minimum wages, limitation of hours,
nightwork, industrial homework, workmen's compensation, occupational disease
legislation, safety, sanitation.) (March 1935) MONTHLY LABOR REV. 670.
1B The NEW YORK PORT AUTHORITY was created by compact between New
York and New Jersey for the port development of the Hudson River. N. Y.
Laws of 1930, c. 419, N. J. Laws of 1930, c. 244; 42 STAT. 822, 19 U. S. C. A.
330; Note (1926) 39 HARV. L. REV. 499; City of New York v. Wilcox, 189 N.
Y. Supp. 724, 115 Misc. 351 (1921). More recently the INTERSTATE SANITATION
COMMISSION to control the flow of refuse into the Hudson River was estab-
lished by a compact between New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut. N. Y.
Laws of 1932, c. 499; N. J. Laws of 1935, cc. 321, 322; N. Y. Times, Sept. 6,
1935 at 12; see also Mingos in N. Y. Times, Feb. 8, 1925, VIII, p. 6 for
an exposition of the reasons for a TRI-STATE DELAWARE RIVER COMPACT, N.
Y. Laws of 1925, c. 177; Carman, Law of Interstate Waters (1931) 5 So.
CALIF. L. REV. 25; Carman, Sovereign Rights and Relations in the Control
and Use of Anterican Waterways (1929-30) 3 So. CALIF. L. REV. 84, 152, 266.
9 Resolves of 1933, c. 44.
1 N. Y. Laws of 1935, c. 186. A commission appointed by Gov. Lehman
will report on Jan. 15, 1936.
MASSACHUSETTS COMM.,ISSION ON INTERSTATE COMPACTS AFFECTING
LABOR AND INDUSTRIES, FIRST REPORT (Jan. 1934), SECOND REPORT (June
1934), THIRD REPORT (Jan. 1935).
' Mass. Acts of 1934, c. 308.
' MINIMUM WAGE COMPACT signed in Concord, N. H., May 29, 1934, by
representatives of Maine, New Hampshire, New York, Rhode Island, Massa-
chusetts, Pennsylvania, and Connecticut. The compact is a non-binding agree-
ment unless ratified by the state legislatures with the consent of Congress.
New Jersey did not sign the compact. See STATE GOVERNMENT, issues for
March, July, and August, 1934, July, 1935; AM. LABOR LEG. REV., June, 1934;
N. Y. Times, Nov. 11, 1934, VIII, p. 12; AMERICA, Oct. 26, 1935.
' Mass. Laws of 1934, c. 383; N. H. Laws of 1935, c. -. See H. R. REP.
No. 281, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. and S. J. REs. 148; H. R. 1642, July 24, 1935;
H. J. RES. 321 (1935).
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The provision for a minimum wage states: 25 "No employer shall pay
a woman or a minor under 21 years of age, an unfair or oppressive
wage." It is proposed that wage boards in the several states shall
determine proper wage scales after investigation and public hearings.
Men have not been included under the present minimum wage com-
pact although they probably will be in the future.
Interstate compacts will bring the states into closer regional
cooperation. A survey of our economic geography indicates that the
various industries and agricultural units of the country are grouped
within regions 26 and not within the boundary of any one state. For
instance, manufacturing centers are located in the northeast, corn
and wheat belts are situated in the midwest, cotton in the south.
This physiographical arrangement of the areas of production brings
with it a distribution of large populations in the industrial regions
and smaller populations in the agricultural regions. It is apparent
that problems relating to labor and industry are often of regional
scope and not peculiar to any one state.
A number of points are to be taken into consideration in respect
to the present interstate compact movement. It was indicated at a
recent conference at Albany 27 that the successful operation of the
compacts will require cooperation from southern industrial competi-
tive states. They stand in a keystone position, for their failure to
cooperate will still enable competing industries from the north to
migrate southward in order to take advantage of backward labor and
industrial standards. The speed of modern transportation facilities
makes this possibility a prominent factor with which to contend.
The compacts would bind the northeastern states while the southern
states prospered at their expense. There is also the danger that
minimum standards of employment might become maximum stand-
ards much to the detriment of labor. While it has been emphasized
at the conferences that the compacts are not to be used as obstruc-
tions for more progressive state and federal legislation, 28 there never-
theless will be the tendency on the part of unscrupulous industrialists
to defeat such legislation by urging the burden to be placed upon the
regional states. It is claimed that the regional system of government
would be cumbersome and artificial, that its administration would be
"Minimum Wage Compact, quoted in SECOND REPORT, supra note 21, tit.
111, §1.
SWHITBECK, INDUSTRIAL GEOGRAPHY (1931); BRIGHAM, UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA, Studies in Physical, Regional, Industrial, and Hunman Geography
(1927).
N. Y. Times, Oct. 19, 20, 1935. See mimeographed report of proceed-
ings. The draft of a forty-hour work week compact was submitted to this
conference but not acted upon.
' Minimum Wage Compact, quoted in SECOND REPORT, Op. cit. supra note
21, tit. I. Pres. William Green, A. F. L., made the objection in a letter to
this writer, dated July 29, 1935, that the compact movement might divert
attention from the ratification of the Child Labor Amendment which requires
twelve more states for ratification. He pointed out that New York and Rhode
Island, two states active in the movement, have not ratified the amendment.
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involved and complex, and that the controlling agencies would be
removed from direct responsibility to the people.29 With all these
alleged shortcomings it is argued in contravention that the state as a
unit of political and economic action is gradually retreating into the
background, and that a unit of government to displace it is now a
matter of economic, social, and political necessity. The interrelation
and interdependence of the states in the growing complexity of the
national economy have all but obliterated their arbitrary boundaries.
Complete centralization in the national government would offer no
solution but instead would lead to a choking bureaucracy. 30 Revision
of the whole Constitution would be required. The region, it is urged,
however, is a logical division of the country based upon economic and
geographical factors and is satisfactory to modern requirements. It
may very well be that the interstate compact movement will be the
first effective stroke aimed to dislodge the State from its tottering
throne and make way for a new structure in the pattern of our
federal government.3 1
Constitutional Aspect.
The states have authority, by virtue of their sovereignty, to
enter into compacts with one another subject to the limitation imposed
by the Federal Constitution.32 Article I, Section 10 of the Consti-
tution provides:
"No State shall without the consent of Congress * * * enter
into any agreement or compact with another State, or with a
foreign power * * *."
The qualified permission to enter into a "compact or agreement" is
further limited by another clause in the same Section which prohibits
the making of any "treaty, alliance, or confederation." Compacts
involving a state's proprietary functions, such as control of water-
ways and boundary settlement, have definitely been established as
N. Y. Evening Post, Oct. 19, 1935, editorial.
'Wigmore, Uniformity of Laws-Compacts Between States (1925) 19
ILL. L. REv. 479; Frankfurter and Landis, op. cit. supra note 1, at 707: "The
regions are less than the nation and are greater than any one state. * * *
National action is the ready alternative. But national action is either unavail-
able or excessive."
'Vandenbosch, Regions versus States (1933) 21 Ky. L. 3. 432; Turner,
Sections v. Nations (1922) 12 YALE REV. (N. s.) 1; Prof. Merriam: "The truth
is that the state is standing upon slippery ground as a political unit." Metro-
politan Regions (May 1928) U. OF CHIC. MAGAZINE; Martin, The Growing
Impotency of the States (1933) Am. BAR ASSN. REP. 222.
' 1 WILLOUGHBY, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (2d ed.
1929) §172; 2 STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION (5th ed. 1891)
§1402.
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constitutional. In prohibiting "alliances" or "confederations" it
would seem that the provision is aimed against political agreements
the purposes of which are to compromise the sovereignty of the state
or of the United States or which would impair the allegiance existing
between the two.33 Compacts affecting labor and industries would
reach far beyond the private rights of sovereignty of the individual
states. Indeed their implications may go so deep as to bring them
within the prohibited category. Labor compacts have a serious test
in overcoming this obstacle.
In some compacts between states questions have arisen as to the
necessity of Congressional consent and also as to when such consent
must be given. While the decisions indicate that for certain purposes
consent is not required or might be implied,3 4 it is doubtful whether
such a rule would apply to pacts involving labor and industries which
would extend in their effect to the very roots of the national economy.
In labor compacts the time for obtaining Congressional consent would
properly be at the conclusion of negotiations among the states, for
that would permit study by Congress of the terms and scope of the
agreement.3 5 Generally, the approval of Congress has been in the
form of an act, but "consent" alone would not seem to require such
formal action. A resolution would probably be sufficient.
Legal Aspect of Concord Compacts.36
In the Concord Compact the states have covenanted that, when
the requisite number have ratified, the pact shall become effective as
to them and the states thereafter ratifying. Any state complying
with the provisions for ratification may join in the agreement and
upon ratification obligates itself to enact legislation to carry out its
terms.
3 7
The Concord Compact further provides that the administration
and enforcement of the pact and the state lavs relating thereto shall
reside with the existing regulatory agencies of the state.38 No change
in their composition or in the scope of their powers is provided for,
except such as the states may deem proper. This scheme of enforcing
a common undertaking by means of the state's own existing agencies
avoids objections of delegations of the state's sovereignty to an
administrative body not under its control.
' For a discussion of the "agreement or compact" clause see Virginia v.
Tennessee, 148 U. S. 503, 13 Sup. Ct. 728 (1893); Holmes v. Jennison, 10
U. S. 540 (1840); Wharton v. Wise, 153 U. S. 155, 14 Sup. Ct. 783 (1894);
Note (1935) 35 COL. L. REv. 76.
Ibid.
'FIRST REPORT, op. cit. supra note 21, at 69.
Supra note 23.
' Tit. II, §6 of Minimunm Wage Compact quoted in SECOND REPORT, op.
cit. supra note 21.
1 Supra note 35, tit. II, §6.
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Each state, by the terms of the compact, has agreed to provide
for a continuing unpaid commission which is to be appointed by its
governor.3 9 This body has authority to deal with the other ratifying
states concerning questions arising under the pact and the operation
of the same within its own state. The President of the United States
will be requested to send a representative. 40 No authority is delegated
to the commission other than to act as a diplomatic corps in contacting
other state commissions and discussing problems that might arise.
The legality of the body does not seem to be questionable.
The chairman of each state commission shall be the representa-
tive of his state upon an interstate commission which shall consist of
all of the chairmen.4 1 Any questions raised by any of the states
under the compact shall be referred to this commission which shall
make an investigation, publish its findings and submit recommenda-
tions. It should be observed that this commission has no authority
other than to act in a consulting and advisory capacity. It cannot
enforce its findings. Any objection, therefore, that the states have
delegated sovereign powers to an extra-territorial agency would be
eliminated. However, if any of the states should later choose to
make the findings of the interstate commission binding upon them,
there is precedent for the same in the Port Authority of New York.
42
This body, established by the states of New York and New Jersey
for the development of port harbors on the Hudson River, has com-
plete control over the port, and its findings bind both states. The
legislature may constitutionally delegate administrative powers to a
board or commission to fill in the details of a general statute, and
rules made in exercise of the power are held to have the force of
the statute.
43
If, after ratification, any state should desire a modification of
any provision of the pact or to extend its scope or revise it, applica-
tion can be made to the interstate commission which shall make rec-
ommendations to the other ratifying states. When a revision, modifi-
cation or extension is so made, consent to the same will then be
required again from Congress.44
Supra note 35, tit. II, §2.
40 Federal membership in the interstate agency presents no constitutional
difficulty. Railroad Co. v. Lowe, 114 U. S. 525, 5 Sup. Ct. 995 (1884).
" Supra note 35, tit. II, §2.
"Supra note 18; Cohen, Tie New York Harbor Problem and Its Legal
Aspect (1920) 5 CORN. L. Q. 377; Note (1926) 39 HARV. L. REv. 499.
" Polinsky v. People, 77 N. Y. 65 (1878) ; in the recent cases of Panama
Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 388, 55 Sup. Ct. 241 (1934) and Schecter
Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495, 55 Sup. Ct. 837 (1935) it was
in respect to "the limitation of the authority to delegate" and not the act of
delegation itself that the Court held Congress to have exceeded its constitutional
power.
"Supra note 35, tit. II, §4. This provision may justify the charge that
regional administration under the pattern of our Federal Constitution would
be involved and circuitous.
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Each state agrees not to withdraw from the compact until it
has reported to the interstate commission the reasons for its desire
to withdraw. The commission, after investigation, is bound to sub-
mit its recommendations in six months. If at the end of that period
the state still wishes to withdraw, it shall defer such action for
two years.
45
The state agencies administering the minimum wage law enacted
in conformity with the compact shall have authority to investigate the
wages of women and minors and to appoint wage boards for the
purpose of recommending minimum fair wage rates. After a public
hearing, the state agency will have authority to make the determina-
tion effective by such procedure as it sees fit. The decisions of the
agency are appealable to the state courts. 46
The means for enforcing the compact are not stated in its pro-
visions. However, the signatory states, by entering into the agree-
ment, subject themselves to the judicial process of the Supreme
Court which has original jurisdiction of controversies between
states.47 But in order to bring an interstate case within the com-
petency of the Court, it must appear that there is a real controversy
between the states as states and the controversy must be justiciable.48
The Supreme Court, in its capacity of arbiter between the sovereign
states is, in a sense, an international tribunal applying the laws of
the land and those of international comity.
4 9
There are three accepted types of relief which a complaining
state may ask of the Court: 50
1. A state may seek a judgment putting it in possession of
disputed territory.
",No other compact has been found in which a withdrawal clause has been
used. ELY, op. cit. suprca note 1, at 209. Virginia v. West Virginia, 78 U. S.
39 (1870) is the only instance where a case endeavored to withdraw from a
compact, cf. Green v. Biddle, 21 U. S. 1 (1823).
46 Supra note 35, tit. II, §7.
'U. S. CONST. Art. III, §2.
"In Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U. S. 249 (1900), Chief Justice Fuller said:
"It must appear that the States are in direct antagonism as States"; New
Hampshire v. Louisiana, 108 U. S. 76 (1883) (no proper interest by complain-
ing state in alleged cause of action) ; Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U. S. 19 (1899)(alleged special interest in a matter of federal control; Guthrie, The Eleventh
Amendment (1908) 8 COL. L. REV. 183.
"' BALCH A WORLD COURT IN THE LIGHT OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME
COURT (1918'); SMITH, AMERICAN SUPREME COURT AS AN INTERNATIONAL
TRIBUNAL (1920); SCOTT, JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF CONTROVERSIES BETWEEN
STATES (1923); WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE SOVEREIGN STATES(1924); SCOTT, SOVEREIGN STATES AND SUITS (1925); Chief Justice Fuller
in Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U. S. 146 (1902) said: "Sitting, as it were, as an
international tribunal, we apply Federal law, State law, and International law,
as the exigencies of a particular case may demand." See Smith, Supreme
Court and the League of Nations (1920) 20 COL. L. REV. 68.
' WARREN, op. cit. supra note 49, at 79.
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2. A state may ask for an injunction to restrain another
state from committing certain alleged unlawful acts.
3. A state may ask for some affirmative action by the Court
in the nature of mandamus.
How far the Supreme Court can go in granting such relief has not
been clearly stated. The case of Virginia v. West Virginia 51 was
the only one in which the Court was faced with the problem of
enforcing a compact breached by a signatory thereto. In that case,
the plaintiff sought a writ of mandamus directed to the State of
West Virginia and the members of her legislature commanding the
levy of a tax to satisfy a judgment previously recovered by Virginia.
Because of the nature of the controversy and the parties involved,
the Court left the matter for private settlement, indicating, however,
that it could enforce its judgments against a state. What means it
could take for enforcement were not stated.
As the decrees of the Supreme Court are binding upon federal
as well as state officers and upon their legislatures, enforcement of
compacts could, in a large measure, be obtained by mandamus or
injunction directed against the state officers.5 2  In the event of
disobedience, they could be held for contempt or for violations of
other acts enacted by Congress for the purpose of executing the Court
order. 53  If a state under a labor compact failed to enact requisite
legislation, mandamus against the members of the legislature might
lie, and refusal to comply would subject them to personal liability.
Similarly, if a state should seek to repudiate the compact by new
legislation, injunction against the members of the legislature or the
governor would be a remedy of a complaining state.54  It would
seem, however, that such far-reaching decrees by the Supreme Court
would be ill-advised and would probably lead to conflict.55
Litigation in this case extended over a period of forty-eight years and
was in the Supreme Court ten times. Virginia v. West Virginia, 78 U. S. 39(1870); 206 U. S. 290, 27 Sup. Ct. 732 (1907); 209 U. S. 514, 28 Sup. Ct. 614
(1908); 220 U. S. 1, 31 Sup. Ct. 330 (1911); 222 U. S. 17, 32 Sup. Ct. 4(1911); 231 U. S. 89, 34 Sup. Ct. 29 (1913) ; 234 U. S. 117, 34 Sup. Ct. 389
(1914); 238 U. S. 202, 35 Sup. Ct. 795 (1915); 241 U. S. 531, 36 Sup. Ct. 719
(1916); 246 U. S. 565, 38 Sup. Ct. 400 (1918). Compare with Green v.
Biddle, 21 U. S. 1 (1823). The dispute in the Virginia v. West Virginia case
was settled by payment of the judgment. See Coleman, The State as a
Defendant Under thw Constitution; The Virginia-West Virginia Debt Con-
troversy (1917) 31 HARV. L. REV. 210; Note (1918) 31 HARv. L. REV. 1158.
'Powell, Coercing a State to Pay a Judgment (1918) 17 MICH. L. REV.
1, 5; cf. Snow, The Execution of Judgments Against States (1916) PROC. OF
Am. Soc. FOR JUDIcIAL SETTLEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTEs 25.
'WARREN, Op. cit. supra note 49, at 80; Coleman, Notes on Suits Between
States (1902) 2 COL. L. REV. 364, 377.
' Ibid.
' In defiance of a writ of error addressed to the courts of Georgia, that
state executed a Cherokee Indian, see Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 9 U. S. 178
(1831). The Supreme Court of Wisconsin refused once to comply with a
[ VOL. 10
NOTES AND COMMENT
A point worth observing in the Concord Compact is that it
creates its own interstate arbitration commission composed of the
chairmen of all the state commissions.56 Any difficulties which may
arise under the compact are to be submitted for settlement to this
body. In this manner, many problems might probably be solved
without the necessity of resorting to the courts. Another interesting
provision of the compact is the one providing for withdrawal by a
state two years after the interstate commission has reported upon the
request for withdrawal.5 7 The states under this provision are not
bound indefinitely to the compact but may free themselves of its
obligations within a period that seems to be reasonable. If it should
develop that a compact has become unduly oppressive to a state,
speedier withdrawal could be obtained by consent of all the signa-
tories.
It is naturally difficult if not impossible to anticipate and particu-
larize the various legal problems which may arise out of the adoption
of interstate compacts. Such difficulty should not, it would seem,
be reason for not accepting what would otherwise appear to be a
progressive experiment to achieve by cooperation a sound status for
labor and industry.
THOMAS BRESS.
TAXATION-THE NONRESIDENT ALIEN'S INCOME WITHIN THE
UNITED STATES.
No doubt is suggested as to the power of Congress to tax income
produced within the United States or arising from sources located
therein, even if it be the income of a nonresident alien.' Prior to
the Sixteenth Amendment the taxation 2 of the nonresident alien's
property was upheld on the theory of lex situs,3 which superseded 4
writ of error directed to it from the Supreme Court of the United States and
went so far as to release an offender by ]abeas corpus from the custody of a
United States marshal. Abelman v. Booth, 62 U. S. 506 (1858) ; SmITH, THE
SUPREME COURT AS AN INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL (1920) 89 et seq.
"'Supra note 35, tit. IT, §4.
" Supra note 35, tit. II, §5.
'Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U. S. 37, 54, 40 Sup. Ct. 221 (1920). The consti-
tutionality of an Oklahoma statute taxing the income produced from oil leases
owned by a non-resident was upheld.
'RFV. AcT OF 1913, c. 16, §11, A, subd. 1. 38 STAT. 166.
'Pullmans Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U. S. 18, 11 Sup. Ct. 876
(1891) deals with a foreign corporation tax. De Ganay v. Collector of Internal
Revenue, 250 U. S. 376, 39 Sup. Ct. 524 (1918) where a French citizen was
taxed on stock in the hands of an active trustee in the United States.
'New Orleans v. Stemple, 175 U. S. 309, 20 Sup. Ct. 110 (1899), a sepa-
rate situs of property is established for purposes of taxation; Bristol v. Wash-
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